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Abstract
Lehman, Blair Allison. MS. The University of Memphis. May 2012. Promoting Learning
by Inducing and Scaffolding Cognitive Disequilibrium and Confusion through System
Feedback. Major Professor: Arthur Graesser, Ph.D.
Learners frequently experience uncertainty about how to proceed during learning. These
experiences cause learners to enter a state of cognitive disequilibrium and its affiliated
affective state of confusion. Cognitive disequilibrium and confusion have been found to
frequently occur during complex learning and provide opportunities for deeper learning.
In the current thesis, a learning environment that induces confusion was investigated. In
the environment, learners engaged in a dialogue on scientific reasoning with an animated
pedagogical agent. Confusion was induced through false feedback provided by the tutor
agent (e.g., when learners responded correctly and were told their response was
incorrect). Self-reports of confusion during the training session indicated that false
feedback was an effective method for inducing confusion. False feedback was also found
to increase learners’ ability to apply this knowledge to new and novel situations, under
certain conditions. Implications for the design of learning environments are also
discussed.
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Introduction
No one wants to be confused. In fact, most people do not even want to admit that
they are confused because confusion is often viewed as revealing a shortcoming or
failure. Recent research, however, has found that increased occurrences of confusion
during learning are often tied to deeper comprehension (Craig, Graesser, Sullins, &
Gholson, 2004; D’Mello & Graesser, in review; D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser,
in review; Graesser, Chipman, King, McDaniel, & D’Mello, 2007; Lehman et al., 2011;
Lehman, D’Mello, & Graesser, in press). It is proposed, however, that it is not the actual
occurrence of confusion that promotes deeper learning, but rather the cognitive activities
that confusion reflects or triggers (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn, Siler, Murray,
Yamauchi, & Baggett, 2003).
Confusion has been found to be diagnostic of cognitive disequilibrium, which
occurs when a person is confronted with system breakdowns, anomalies, contradictions,
impasses, and uncertainty about how to proceed (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Caroll &
Kay, 1988; VanLehn et al., 2003). Once cognitive disequilibrium and confusion have
occurred, learners engage in effortful problem solving activities to resolve disequilibrium
and return to a state of equilibrium. It is this effortful reasoning and problem solving that
can produce deeper learning depending on whether confusion has been resolved or not
(D’Mello et al., in review; D’Mello & Graesser, in review; VanLehn et al., 2003).
So how can learning technologies capitalize on the relationship between
confusion and learning? One strategy is to take advantage of the instances of confusion
that naturally arise during learning activities. When confusion occurs, learning
technologies can scaffold learning during this affective state in much the same manner
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that these systems already scaffold learners’ cognitive states. For example, a learning
technology can respond differently when a learner is incorrect and confused compared to
when a learner is incorrect but not confused. In fact, some learning technologies already
exist that adaptively respond to learners’ emotional states when they arise during learning
(D’Mello, Craig, Fike, & Graesser, 2009; Litman & Forbes-Riley, 2006). A second
strategy is to induce the states of cognitive disequilibrium and confusion during learning.
For example, if a learner has a previously held misconception, the ITS can induce
confusion by forcing the learner to confront and eventually correct this erroneous belief.
It is this latter strategy that will be investigated in this thesis.
Emotions and Learning
Whereas folklore psychology considers cognition and emotion as either opposing
processes or disparate parts of mental functioning, a preponderance of research has
shown that cognition and emotion are inextricably linked (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, &
Gross, 2007; Bower, 1981; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Dagleish & Power, 1999; Lazarus,
1999; Mandler, 1984; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone,
2001; Stein & Levine, 1991). In fact, it has been suggested that cognitive processes such
as memory, reasoning, and deliberation all involve the experience of emotion (Stein,
Hernandez, & Trabasso, 2008). For example, attempts to suppress emotional states can
have negative consequences for the memory of important details (Richards & Gross,
1999). It could be argued that an adequate understanding of any cognitive process
requires an understanding of the emotions that accompany the cognitive process.
In the last decade, there has been an increase of research on the specific emotions
that occur during complex learning. One general conclusion from this line of research has

2

been that it is not Ekman’s (1973) six “basic” emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness,
sadness, and surprise) that occur during learning, but rather it is emotions that are more
specific to the learning context that frequently occur (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al.,
2006; Dragon et al., 2008; Graesser et al., 2007; Kort, Reilly, & Picard, 2001;
McQuiggan & Lester, 2009; Pekrun, 2010; Woolf et al., 2009).
Emotions that are specific to learning have been identified in a variety of contexts,
from learning across an entire semester (Pekrun, 2010) to shorter learning sessions (30
minutes to 1.5 hours) (Arroyo et al., 2009; Burleson & Picard, 2007; Chaffar, Derbali, &
Frasson, 2009; Conati & Maclaren, 2009; D’Mello et al., 2009; Forbes-Riley & Litman,
2009; Robison, McQuiggan, & Lester, 2009). Pekrun and colleagues have identified a set
of academic emotions that occur across a variety of activities over the course of a
semester or entire year of school. These emotions are associated with (a) outcomes
(achievement, e.g., contentment, anxiety, and frustration), (b) different topics (topic, e.g.,
empathy for the protagonist in a novel), (c) interpersonal interactions (social, e.g., pride,
shame, and jealousy), (d) and new information (epistemic, e.g., surprise and confusion).
Research on shorter learning sessions (30 minutes to 1.5 hours) has revealed a
second set of learning-centered emotions. The learning-centered emotions include some
of the academic emotions identified by Pekrun and colleagues, along with some
additional emotions. These learning-centered emotions include anxiety, boredom,
confusion, curiosity, engagement/flow, frustration, happiness, delight, and surprise
(Calvo & D’Mello, 2011; Rodrigo & Baker, 2011a). The current thesis focuses on this set
of learning-centered emotions and shorter learning sessions. Investigations of learner
emotional experiences within different ITSs and serious games have shown that these-
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learning centered emotions are prevalent (Baker, D’Mello, Rodrigo, & Graesser, 2010;
Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; D’Mello & Graesser, 2011; Graesser et al., 2007;
McQuiggan, Robison, & Lester, 2010; Rodrigo & Baker, 2011a; 2011b). The learningcentered emotions were also found to be prevalent during one-to-one human tutoring
sessions, with confusion being the most prevalent emotion (Lehman et al., 2008).
Research on emotions while interacting with an ITS called AutoTutor (Graesser et
al., 2004) indicated that the most frequently occurring emotions were the learningcentered emotions (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; Graesser et al., 2007) and
found that these emotions were differentially related to learning outcomes. Boredom and
frustration were found to be negatively correlated with learning outcomes, whereas
confusion and flow were positively related to learning while interacting with AutoTutor
(Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; Graesser et al., 2007). Although confusion and
flow were found to be positively correlated with learning, there have been few
investigations into the causal links between these emotional states and learning outcomes
(D’Mello et al., in review; Lehman et al., in press).
Emotional experience is an integral part of complex learning but it is not the case
that all emotions facilitate learning. Emotions such as anxiety and boredom impede
learning by reducing motivation and engagement (Kort et al., 2001; Snow, Corno, &
Jackson, 1996). Many traditional theories of emotion and learning posited that
negatively-valenced emotions hinder learning whereas positively-valenced emotions
promote learning, but contemporary empirical evidence demonstrates that this is not
always the case (Allen & Carifio, 1995; Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al., 2006; Graesser
et al., 2007; Spering, Wagener, & Funke, 2005). Instead, it appears that there are cases in
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which both positive and negative emotions can facilitate learning. For example, positive
affect has been found to increase flexibility and creative thinking (Fielder, 2001; Isen,
2001; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Negative affect, on the other hand, has been
associated with a more narrow, but methodical approach to assessing the problem and
finding the solution (Bless & Fielder, 1995; Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000;
Schwarz, 1990; 2000). Confusion is one such negative emotion that has been positively
correlated with learning (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello & Graesser, 2011; Graesser et al.,
2007). It is important to note that both approaches (i.e., creative or methodical thinking)
to problem solving can be effective or ineffective depending on the nature of the task.
While empirical research has attempted to identify the emotions that occur during
learning, there are also several theories that have been proposed that predict the emotions
that will occur during learning, decision-making, and effortful problem solving. Flow
theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) focuses on the level of engagement during the learning
process. There are two conditions necessary for flow to occur. The first condition is that
there needs to be a perceived challenge that pushes the learner’s skill level, without being
so challenging that the learner cannot complete the task. Thus, it is an interaction between
learners’ skill level and the challenge presented by the task. The second condition is that
a clear goal and immediate feedback about progress toward that goal is available. Thus,
learners experience flow when they are presented with a clear goal, are sufficiently
challenged but not to the point of bewilderment, and receive feedback on their
performance. Conversely, flow theory predicts that when learners are not sufficiently
challenged by the learning task, are given a task that is too easy given their current skill
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level, or are not sure of the current goal, they will transition to disengagement or
boredom.
Another theory that predicts the occurrence of different emotions during complex
cognitive tasks is goal-appraisal theory (Scherer et al., 2001; Stein & Levine, 1991).
Goal-appraisal theory predicts different affective responses based on progression towards
achieving a goal. During a complex task like learning, learners generate goals and subgoals that they want to achieve. For example, a learner may have the superordinate goal
of getting an A in a physics class, which will generate sub-goals to understand
mechanics, electricity, thermodynamics, etc. When working towards achieving a goal or
sub-goal, events can occur that will either facilitate or interfere with goal achievement.
Events can range from internal (learner realizes a new method to solve a problem) to
external (teacher provides a helpful hint) events that occur during the learning process. In
general, events that facilitate goal achievement are expected to produce positivelyvalenced emotions (e.g., happiness) and events that impede goal achievement are
expected to produce negatively-valenced emotions (e.g., frustration or sadness).
However, the intensity of the emotional experience is determined by the degree to which
an event impacts goal achievement. An event viewed as a minor aid to achieving a goal
might bring on mild feelings of satisfaction, whereas an event that reveals the correct
solution to a difficult problem may induce joy or eureka.
Goal-blocking events bring about a variety of emotional experiences that vary in
intensity as well as the availability of a plan to circumvent the current obstacle (Stein &
Levine, 1991; Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). When goal achievement is blocked there
are two possible situations. In one situation, the learner is aware of an available plan to
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continue working towards the intended goal. This type of obstacle might produce a state
of mild irritation due to the temporary nature of the impediment. The other situation is
when an inhibitory event has occurred and there is no available plan. An obstacle of this
nature is likely to evoke stronger emotions that may further prevent a person from
engaging in effective problem solving. In summary, relevance of events to current goals
and appraisals of plan availability, ultimately determines the emotional experience.
Confusion and Learning
As highlighted above, confusion is a state that has been found to frequently occur
during learning, is tied to the learning process, and is correlated with deep learning.
Confusion has been defined in a variety of ways across previous research: an emotion
(Rozin & Cohen, 2003), a knowledge emotion (Silvia, 2010), an epistemic emotion
(Pekrun & Stephens, in press), an affective state that is not an emotion (Keltner & Shiota,
2003), and a cognitive state (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). The present thesis takes the
point of view that confusion is an epistemic or knowledge emotion (Pekrun & Stephens,
in press; Silvia, 2010). Confusion emerges when an impasse has been reached, either
through a contradiction, anomaly, system breakdown, error, or when there is uncertainty
about how to proceed. These events elicit confusion because they represent a discrepancy
between the learner’s knowledge and the information being presented. When impasses
are detected, learners are placed in a state of cognitive disequilibrium (Bjork & Linn,
2006; Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952). It is assumed that there is a
natural desire to be in a state of cognitive equilibrium, so when disequilibrium occurs,
effortful problem solving and deliberation begin. Learners who do not attempt to restore
equilibrium are likely to disengage from the task. This effort to restore equilibrium results
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in greater effort and engagement in problem solving and reasoning, both of which can
lead to increased learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Caroll & Kay, 1988; Graesser &
Olde, 2003; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; VanLehn et al., 2003). A learning environment that
can take advantage of these cognitive benefits of impasses, cognitive disequilibrium, and
confusion would promote deep learning of conceptual information (D’Mello & Graesser,
2012).
The mere occurrence of impasses, cognitive disequilibrium, and confusion is not
expected to result in increased learning (VanLehn et al., 2003). According to impassedriven theories of learning, deep learning results from the cognitive activities (i.e.,
effortful elaboration and causal reasoning during problem solving) associated with
impasse resolution (D’Mello & Graesser, in review; Graesser et al., 2007). These
cognitive activities emerge from desirable difficulties (Bjork & Linn, 2006). An analysis
of over 100 hours of human-human tutorial dialogues supported the benefits of impasse
resolution (VanLehn et al., 2003). Comprehension of physics concepts was rare when
learners did not reach an impasse, irrespective of the quality of explanations provided by
the tutor. The act of resolving desirable difficulties has been found to increase depth of
processing as well as more successful memory retrieval (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik
& Tulving, 1972).
While it may seem intuitive for a learning environment to minimize the
occurrence of confusion and help the learner immediately resolve any occurrence of
confusion, the current thesis proposes a different perspective. Given the productive
activities initiated by impasses, cognitive disequilibrium, and confusion, the current
thesis suggests encouraging and scaffolding the occurrence of these states. Recent

8

research has had some success at inducing cognitive disequilibrium and confusion during
learning through the presentation of system breakdowns (D’Mello & Graesser, in review)
and contradictory information (D’Mello et al., in review; Lehman et al., 2011). This
research is briefly reviewed below.
In two experiments D’Mello and Graesser (in review) induced impasses,
cognitive disequilibrium, and confusion through device breakdowns. In these
experiments participants were first presented an illustrated text of a device (e.g., a
cylinder lock) and given 1.5 minutes (Experiment 1) to 2 minutes (Experiment 2) to study
how the device worked. Participants were then presented with the same illustrated text
and an additional prompt. This additional prompt described some type of breakdown that
had occurred in the device (experimental condition). The cylinder lock, for example, had
the following breakdown prompt: “A person puts the key into the lock and turns the lock
but the bolt doesn’t move. Try to understand what is wrong with the cylinder lock.”
(D’Mello & Graesser, in review). Participants were then given an additional 1.5 to 2
minutes to try to determine why the device was not functioning. In Experiment 1, the
participants in the control condition simply re-read the illustrated text. In Experiment 2
participants in the control condition were presented with the same illustrated text with an
additional prompt to focus on a key component of the device. Participants studied four
devices over the course of the learning session.
Confusion was measured in two ways. First, participants rated their confusion
level with an online affective questionnaire at multiple points during the session. Second,
participants engaged in a retrospective confusion judgment protocol (Graesser et al.,
2006) after viewing all four devices. Participants watched a video of their face and were
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provided with the illustrated text for the device viewed at that time (i.e., context) and
made periodic confusion ratings on a scale of zero to 10. Breakdown scenarios were
found to induce greater levels of confusion. It was also found that participants with
higher aptitude, as measured by SAT scores, were more likely to resolve occurrences of
cognitive disequilibrium and confusion. Participants who resolved or partially-resolved
their confusion displayed better understanding of device functioning than those who did
not resolve their confusion.
The second set of experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 3) induced confusion with
contradictions presented by two animated pedagogical agents (D’Mello et al., in review;
Lehman et al., 2011). The tutor agent guided the student agent and human learner through
the learning session, while the student agent served as a peer learner. In all three
experiments, the tutor and student agents discussed scientific reasoning topics with the
human learners (e.g., control group, experimenter bias). Each topic was discussed in the
context of a research case study with a trialogue (i.e., conversation among the human,
tutor, and student agents) that evaluated the scientific merits of the case study. One study,
for example, discussed the testing of a new miracle diet pill. Although the case study
claimed that the diet pill was extremely effective, the study was flawed because the
control group was inappropriate.
All three experiments included four conditions that varied the presentation of
contradictory information. In the true-true condition, the tutor agent presented a correct
claim and the student agent agreed with the tutor (control condition). In the true-false
condition, the tutor presented a correct opinion and the student agent disagreed by
presenting an incorrect opinion. In contrast, it was the student agent who provided the
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correct opinion and the tutor agent who disagreed by providing an incorrect opinion in
the false-true condition. Finally in the false-false condition, the tutor agent provided an
incorrect opinion and the student agent agreed with this incorrect opinion. After both
agents had asserted their opinions, the learner was invited to state whether the study was
or was not flawed by providing responses to forced-choice questions throughout the
trialogue.
Learners discussed the scientific merits of eight studies with the two pedagogical
agents for Experiments 1 and 2 and four studies for Experiment 3. Learners then
completed a retrospective affect judgment (Graesser et al., 2006) in which they viewed
synchronized videos of their face and screen from their interactions with the two agents
(Experiments 1 and 2). Confusion and uncertainty were measured by learners’ selfreported confusion levels via the retrospective affect judgment protocol (Experiments 1
and 2) and their responses to forced-choice questions during the interaction (Experiments
1-3). Self-reported confusion levels indicated that more confusion occurred in the truefalse and false-true (Experiments 1 and 2) conditions when compared to the true-true
condition (control). Learner responses revealed greater uncertainty in all three
experimental conditions (true-false, false-true, false-false) when compared to the control
condition (true-true).
Experiences of confusion and uncertainty were tied to increased learning in all
three experiments. Specifically, learners in the false-true condition (Experiments 1 and 2)
and the true-false (Experiment 2 only) conditions that reported more confusion
performed better on an assessment of scientific reasoning skills compared to the nocontradiction control condition. In addition, Experiment 3 revealed that learner
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performance on forced-choice questions during the trialogue was related to learner
performance on transfer tasks that required the diagnosis of flaws in case studies.
Specifically, learners who displayed uncertainty (i.e., responded incorrectly) performed
better on transfer tasks.
When combined with the findings from the device breakdown studies, these
results indicate that confusion can be induced during learning with some success and that
both the presence and resolution of confusion were diagnostic of improved performance
on subsequent knowledge tests. This thesis expanded upon this past research by exploring
a new medium for confusion induction and its subsequent impact on learning.
Specifically, the focus was on the impact of system feedback as a method of confusion
induction. Before the current research is discussed, some discussion is needed on past
research on feedback during learning.
Feedback and Learning
Feedback is an important part of the learning process because it affirms accurate
knowledge and corrects error-ridden knowledge for learners (Albertson, 1986; Azevedo
& Bernard, 1995). However, despite all of the research conducted on the different aspects
of feedback and how each impacts learning, there have not been consistent findings that
one type of feedback (e.g., elaborated or delayed) increases learning (for reviews of
research see Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Shute, 2008). Some elements of feedback have been
found to be detrimental to learning: when feedback is perceived as criticizing or
controlling (Baron, 1993; Fedor, Davis, Maslyn, & Mathieson, 2001), when feedback
compares learners to peers, when feedback is vague (Butler, 1987; McColskey & Leary,
1985), and when feedback interrupts the flow of active problem solving (Corno & Snow,
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1986). The contradictory findings about feedback warrant further research into the
different feedback characteristics and how each one impacts learning.
The majority of research on feedback has followed three main strands: timing,
directness, and elaboration. The driving question for feedback timing is whether
immediate or delayed feedback better promotes learning. Research supporting delayed
presentation of feedback claims that the delay allows for continued problem solving
without interruption, allowing for learners to self-correct and achieve a deeper
understanding of the material (Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; Surber & Anderson, 1975).
However, research on an ITS, the ACT Programming Tutor, has shown that immediate
feedback is more beneficial for promoting learning (Anderson, Corbett, Koedinger, &
Pelletier, 1995). It may be the case that immediate versus delayed feedback are suited to
different tasks, but further experimentation is required to resolve this.
The second strand is the degree to which feedback is delivered directly to
learners. Directness of feedback refers to how explicitly a tutor delivers feedback stating
that the learner response is correct or incorrect. It has been proposed that expert human
tutors use indirect feedback while interacting with learners (Lepper & Woolverton, 2002;
Merrill, Reiser, Ranney, & Trafton, 1992). This claim means that expert tutors minimize
providing feedback on the quality of learners’ responses. Instead, these tutors allow
learners to find the correct answer on their own with the tutor’s support but not
evaluation. However, there is also evidence that expert human tutors do provide direct,
immediate feedback to learners during the tutoring sessions (D’Mello, Lehman, &
Person, 2010). Direct feedback may be the most effective for novice learners (Knoblauch
& Brannon, 1981; Moreno, 2004).
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The third strand of research has focused on the complexity and amount of
information delivered with feedback. Feedback can range from simply correct/incorrect
to an elaborated explanation of why one option is correct. Although it may seem obvious
that the longer explanation would most benefit learning, the findings are varied (Shute,
2008). Elaborated feedback has the advantage of specificity (Bangert-Drowns, Kulik,
Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; Pridemore & Klein, 1995). By specifying the reasons for why a
response is correct or incorrect learners are not left with feelings of uncertainty about
how to use the feedback (Fedor, 1991). However, feedback that is less elaborate can be
effective as well (Kulhavy, White, Topp, Chan, & Adams, 1985). Feedback that contains
too much information has the potential liability of losing focus and increasing
interference for the learner. In other research, there has been no difference between
simple and complex feedback in terms of learning (Schimmel, 1983; Sleeman, Kelly,
Martinak, Ward, & Moore, 1989).
A fourth aspect of feedback that has been largely ignored by previous research
pertains to feedback accuracy. Specifically, there has been a paucity of research
investigating the differential impacts of accurate versus inaccurate feedback on learning
(for exceptions, see D’Mello et al., 2011 and Miller, 2010 for uses of the false feedback
paradigm within problem solving). Based on past research, there seems to be an
assumption that feedback should be accurate; it is just the method of delivery that is
somewhat debated. Research on inaccurate feedback has mainly been limited to false
feedback on personality assessments (e.g., Harris & Greene, 1984; McFarlane, Polivy, &
Herman, 1998) and false physiological feedback (e.g., heart rate, weight) (e.g., Borkovec
& Glasgow, 1973; Davies, 1994). False feedback on physiological measures has been
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used help people cope with extreme emotions (Borkovec & Glasgow, 1973; Karsdorp,
Kindt, Rietveld, Everaerd, & Mulder, 2009; Russell & Davey, 1991), phobias (Ehlers,
Margraf, Roth, Taylor et al., 1988; Story & Craske, 2008; Wild, Clark, Ehlers, &
McManus, 2008), and dysfunctional sexual behavior (McCall & Meston, 2007; Palace,
1995; Stone, Clark, Sbrocco, & Lewis, 2009). However, in each of these cases, learning
is operationalized as the correction of deviant or maladaptive behavior and not creating or
modifying existing mental models of complex topics.
The question arises as to why or how false feedback would be implemented in a
learning environment. It seems intuitive that any feedback provided to the learner should
be accurate. Otherwise, there is the potential to prolong or strengthen misconceptions
help by the learner (Roediger, 1974; Roediger & Neely, 1982; Roediger, Stellon, &
Tulving, 1977). However, there is some evidence from research on peer feedback that
suggests inaccurate feedback may not always be detrimental to learning (Gielen, Peeters,
Dochy, Onghena, & Struyven, 2010; Van Steendam, Rijlaarsdam, Sercu, & Van den
Burgh, 2010; Yang, Badger, & Yu, 2006). Peer feedback can frequently be inaccurate
due to the knowledge gaps and misconceptions held by peer learners. In some cases,
inaccurate feedback may actually be beneficial for learning because it creates uncertainty,
which triggers the learner to reflect and think more deeply about the material (Gielen et
al., 2010; Yang et al., 2006). These findings suggest that, under the certain circumstances,
inaccurate feedback could potentially be utilized to promote learning.
Overview of Present Research and Hypotheses
Previous research on peer feedback has found that inaccurate feedback may be
successful because it places learners into a state of uncertainty, which causes deeper

15

reflection and processing (Gielen et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2006). This hypothesis is
consistent with cognitive disequilibrium theory, which proposes that uncertainty about
how to proceed is caused by reaching an impasse and indicative of experiences of
confusion and cognitive disequilibrium (Bjork & Linn, 2006; Festinger, 1957; Graesser et
al., 2005; Piaget, 1952). Along these lines and to build on previous confusion induction
research, the current thesis investigated the effects of confusion during learning by
inducing confusion through another medium: system feedback. Whereas most learning
environments use feedback to adaptively respond to the quality of learners’ responses, the
current thesis suggests a different use for feedback. The hypothesis is that providing
inaccurate feedback would induce confusion in learners in the same manner that was
previously discussed for device breakdowns and contradictions. Inaccurate feedback
could create confusion as well by creating increased feelings of uncertainty about how to
proceed.
When learners are informed that a response is incorrect, they must reevaluate and
engage in active problem solving to revise existing mental models. But what would occur
if negative feedback were provided to correct responses? Would this discrepancy in the
mental model trigger confusion? And, if confusion were induced, would the learner
actively try to resolve the confusion, thereby reaching a deeper level of understanding?
This thesis attempts to answer these questions. Specifically, are there are situations in
which inaccurate feedback is more beneficial to learning because of the possible
induction of confusion.
The current thesis investigated the potential of inaccurate feedback to improve
deep learning by testing the effects of feedback (accurate and inaccurate) when learners
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evaluated the scientific merits of research case studies. Critical evaluation of case studies
involves scientific reasoning skills such as stating hypotheses, identifying dependent and
independent variables, isolating potential confounds in designs, and determining if data
support predictions (Halpern, 2003; Roth et al, 2006). Learners engaged in dialogues with
an animated pedagogical agent in which they received feedback (accurate or inaccurate)
on the quality of their evaluation of the case study.
The current thesis hypothesized that inaccurate feedback could serve as the
catalyst to induce confusion during learning (false feedback hypothesis). For any given
question, learners could answer either correctly or incorrectly and the tutor agent could
provide positive or negative feedback, that is, either accurate or inaccurate. Table 1
depicts the possible combinations of answer quality and feedback as well as the predicted
level of induced confusion. The current thesis predicted that the two inaccurate feedback
conditions were not likely to result in the same degree of confusion. In the correctnegative condition, learners would experience an obstacle to the goal of successfully
answering the question, as well as experiencing uncertainty about how to proceed.
Although this may seem to imply that all instances of negative feedback would induce
confusion, this is not necessarily the case. For example, if a learner responded incorrectly
there may not be the same expectation for positive feedback. In other words, learners’
confidence that their response was correct would influence whether accurate, negative
feedback induced confusion. The other inaccurate feedback condition, incorrect-positive,
may or may not result in confusion.
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Table 1
Predictions Based on Answer Quality and Feedback Type
Answer Quality

Feedback Type

Predicted Confusion

Correct
Correct
Incorrect
Incorrect

Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative

None
Full
Some
Some or None

Accurate feedback, on the other hand, was not expected to induce confusion to the
same degree as inaccurate feedback, if at all. A correct response coupled with positive
feedback was not expected to result in an experience of confusion. However, when
negative feedback was delivered after an incorrect response, confusion may be present,
depending on learners’ confidence in their response.
As mentioned previously, learners’ can be confident or not confident in the
correctness of their response prior to receiving feedback. Learners’ confidence can
impact their expectation for positive feedback. This impact on learners’ expectations is
likely to influence the effectiveness of false feedback as a method for confusion
induction. For example, a learner who is incorrect, but confident in the correctness of
their response will expect positive feedback. Thus, even though the negative feedback is
accurate, it violates the learner’s expectation and the accurate feedback may trigger a
state of confusion for the learner. The current thesis hypothesized that answer confidence
would moderate the effect of inaccurate feedback on confusion induction (confidence
moderation hypothesis).
There are four combinations of confidence level, answer quality, and feedback
type that were not expected to result in confusion. Each combination involved an
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alignment between learners’ expectations and the resulting feedback. In other words,
learners were confident that their answer was correct and receive positive feedback or
they were not confident and received negative feedback. Confusion was expected to
occur when there was not alignment between learners’ expectations and the feedback
received.
Confusion was expected to be maximized when learners were confident in their
answer and received negative feedback because this violates expectations. Providing
negative feedback when participants are confident and answer correctly is expected to
trigger a discrepancy in their mental models and trigger confusion. Significant confusion
was also expected when negative feedback is provided to learners who are confident but
answer incorrectly.
Providing positive feedback when participants are not confident in their responses
is another situation where expectations and feedback do not align because there is a
violation of expectations. That is, they expect negative or neutral feedback irrespective of
answer quality because they lack confidence in their responses. However, the level of
confusion is not expected to be as intense, if it occurs at all, as in the previous case with
negative feedback because unexpected positive feedback might induce a positive
emotional state.
Last, the current thesis hypothesized that once confusion has occurred, it will
trigger beneficial cognitive activities (e.g., reflection, problem solving) and the
occurrence of these cognitive activities will facilitate learning (facilitative confusion
hypothesis). Although cognitive disequilibrium, confusion, and impasses have been
associated with learning gains (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Caroll & Kay, 1988; Graesser
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& Olde, 2003; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; VanLehn et al., 2003), it is the beneficial
cognitive activities (reflection, deliberation, etc.) that they trigger that are ostensibly
linked to deeper learning. Hence, the facilitative confusion hypothesis predicts that once
confusion has occurred, learners would begin to actively reason and engage in problem
solving activities in an effort to restore equilibrium, and would reach a deeper level of
understanding. Although it seems plausible that learners must resolve their confusion to
achieve deep learning, there is some evidence that partial-resolution (D’Mello &
Graesser, in review) or simply engaging in the cognitive activities triggered by confusion
(D’Mello et al., in review) can result in deep learning. Thus, the experience of confusion,
regardless of resolution, was also hypothesized to facilitate learning.
Method
Participants and Design
There were 167 participants in the experiment. Participants (called learners for the
remainder of the paper) were undergraduate students from a midsouth university in the
US who received course credit for participation. The experiment had a within-subjects
design with four conditions (correct-positive, correct-negative, incorrect-negative,
incorrect-positive), discussed further below. Learners completed two sessions in which
they received accurate feedback and two sessions in which they received inaccurate
feedback. However, due to the fact that condition assignment was partially dependent
upon learner responses, it was not guaranteed that each learner would experience all four
conditions. Order of conditions (accurate vs. inaccurate feedback) and topics and
assignment of topics to conditions were counterbalanced across learners with a GraecoLatin Square.
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Manipulation
Confusion was experimentally induced with a false feedback manipulation over
the course of learning scientific reasoning topics (e.g., random assignment, replication).
This was achieved by having an animated pedagogical agent (tutor) ask the learner a
forced-choice question. Then the tutor agent provided the learner with inaccurate
feedback. Inaccurate feedback was expected to trigger conflict and force the learner to
reflect, deliberate, and decide whether his or her initial response was correct.
Inaccurate feedback was delivered during a dialogue in which flaws in case
studies were identified. All studies contained subtle methodological flaws. There were
four feedback conditions based on learners’ answer quality (correct, incorrect) and the
tutor agent’s feedback (positive: “Yes, that’s right,” negative: “No, that’s not right.”).
Learners who responded correctly to the forced-choice question either received accurate,
positive feedback (correct-positive) or inaccurate, negative feedback (correct-negative).
In the other two conditions learners had responded incorrectly. Learners in the incorrectnegative condition received accurate, negative feedback, whereas those in the incorrectpositive condition received inaccurate, positive feedback. The accurate feedback
conditions (correct-positive and incorrect-negative) served as the control conditions.
Knowledge Tests
In all knowledge tests, the current experiment focused on four scientific reasoning
topics: control group, experimenter bias, random assignment, and replication. There were
two types of tests used to assess scientific reasoning knowledge. First, learners’
knowledge of the definition of each topic was assessed. This assessment was presented
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before and after all of the training sessions had been completed, pretest and posttest,
respectively. Two versions of the test were created and order of presentation was
counterbalanced across learners. Each test version consisted of eight four-foil multiplechoice questions. There was one question pertaining to each topic and four questions that
pertained to four additional topics that were not covered in the session (construct validity,
correlational studies, generalizability, measurement quality).
The second knowledge assessment required learners to evaluate the scientific
merit of case studies. Learners were presented with new case studies (i.e., not discussed
during the training sessions) and asked to diagnose any potential flaws in the
methodology. For each case study, learners selected from eight options (four topics and
four distractor topics) to label as flawed or not flawed, as well as the option to indicate
that the study was not flawed. In truth, each study had one flaw. Learners were presented
with near and far transfer studies (see Appendix A). The near transfer studies differed
from the studies discussed in the training sessions on surface features, whereas the far
transfer studies differed on both surface and structural features. For example, a surface
feature difference could be taking a diet pill (original study) versus an acne pill (near
transfer study), whereas structural feature differences could be experimental-do nothing
control groups (original study) versus 3 or more comparison groups all receiving some
type of treatment (far transfer study). Each topic had a near and far transfer study,
resulting in four near transfer and four far transfer studies. This assessment was only
presented to learners after they had completed the training sessions.
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Training Sessions
Each training session consisted of four phases: (1) manipulation, (2) probe, (3)
remediation, and (4) post-remediation. The manipulation phase began with a description
of the topic (e.g., experimenter bias) and the case study that was being discussed. For
example, in Table 2, dialogue turns one through seven represent the manipulation phase.
The excerpt in Table 2 is an example dialogue between the tutor agent (Dr. Smith) and
the human learner (Bob) from the correct-negative condition. Dr. Smith and Bob are
discussing a case study that has experimenter bias as its flaw. Learners read the study and
then were presented with the first forced-choice question of the training session. Forcedchoice questions consisted of three response options: target, thematic miss, and distractor
(see Table 2). The target was the correct answer option, whereas the thematic miss and
distractor were both incorrect. The thematic miss was an option that was related to the
topic, but was not actually related to the question, whereas the distractor was not at all
related to the topic of the question.
After being presented with the forced-choice question (turn 1), learners delivered
a response (turn 2) and the tutor agent provided feedback about the quality of the
response (turn 3). Prior to receiving feedback, learners were asked to indicate whether
they were confident or not confident in the correctness of their response (not shown).
Learners were given the opportunity to either change their response (not confident) or
stay with the same response option originally selected (confident). The manipulation
phase was the only phase of the training session in which learners received feedback
about the quality of their responses. The feedback delivered could either be accurate or
inaccurate, regardless of the actual quality of the response.
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After receiving feedback, learners were then prompted by the tutor agent to
indicate when they were ready to continue with the training session. This response time
was used as an indicator of learners’ reactions to the feedback received.
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Table 2
Example Dialogue Excerpt from Correct-Inaccurate Condition
Turn Speaker Dialogue
Half of the autistic children at a therapy center received the facilitated communication
treatment and half didn't. Researchers who had been working with these kids wanted to
see if the treatment worked. So they ran a study to test it. They stood nearby while the
kids wrote about a happy experience so that they could encourage them to write
until the kids wrote four sentences. The researchers found that the facilitated
communication treatment did work. <Case study>
1 Dr.
Bob, could the researchers have behaved in a way that
Smith
influenced the results? <Forced-choice question>
A. behaved differently with students that received or didn't receive treatment <Target>
B. received training, so they all behaved the same in all experiments <Thematic Miss>
C. it doesn't matter, it won't have an effect on the results <Distractor>
2 Bob
A <Correct response>
3 Dr.
Wrong Bob. That's not the correct answer. <False, negative
Smith
feedback>
4 Dr.
Bob, type OK when you're ready to keep going. <Feedback
Smith
response prompt>
5 Bob
ok <Feedback response latency measure>
6 Dr.
Bob, would your classmates be confused by this stuff?
Smith
<Confusion prompt>
7 Bob
confused <Self-reported confusion>
Half of the students in a learning disability class received the test-taking pro treatment
and half didn't. The researchers that developed it worked with these students. They
wanted to see if the treatment really worked, so they ran a study to evaluate it. All of
the students took a test. The researchers wanted to have the same amount of data
for each student, so they stood nearby to answer any questions. The researchers
found that the test-taking pro treatment did work. <Near transfer case study>
8 Dr.
Smith
9 Bob

Bob, could the researchers' behavior have influenced the results?
<Forced-choice question>
B <Incorrect response>

One of the easiest factors of the environment to control is the effect of the researcher.
We know from several experiments, that the behavior or expectations of a researcher
can have a significant impact on the results of an experiment....<Explanatory text>
10 Dr.
Smith
11 Bob
12 Dr.
Smith
13 Bob

Bob, would one of your classmates be confused? <Confusion
prompt>
not confused <Self-reported confusion>
So Bob, could the researchers have influenced the results? <Forcedchoice question>
C <Correct response>
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After learners indicated that they were ready to continue, they were prompted to
self-report whether they were confused or not (turns 6-7). Learners were prompted to
indicate a classmate’s level of confusion, rather than their own (turn 6). The confusion
prompt was phrased in this manner because it is hypothesized that many learners believe
that being in a state of confusion is indicative of poor performance or failure. This view
of confusion during learning could manifest in a reluctance to admit experiences of
confusion. By prompting learners to indicate a classmate’s confusion, the current thesis
sought to avoid this biased opinion of confusion.
Next, the probe phase occurred. The probe phase (turns 8-9) consisted of learners
being guided through the evaluation of a second research case study (probe study) by the
tutor agent. The probe study differed only on surface features from the original study.
The flawed scientific reasoning topic was the same in both studies. Learners were
presented with a forced-choice question about the scientific merits of the probe study
(turn 8) and then provided a response (turn 9). During the probe phase learners did not
receive feedback on the quality of their response. Instead, the tutor agent only
acknowledged learners’ responses (e.g., “Ok, Bob, you say A.”). Learners only received
feedback on the quality of their responses in the manipulation phase to isolate the impact
of feedback on confusion and induction in learning. If feedback had been delivered
throughout the training session (e.g., manipulation, probe, and post-remediation phase), it
would be difficult to determine the impact of accurate inaccurate feedback.
Learners then continued on to the remediation phase. During the remediation
phase, learners were presented with an explanatory text (see Appendix B). The texts
contained an average of 364 words (SD = 41.7 words) and were adapted from the
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electronic textbook that accompanies the ARIES! Intelligent Tutoring System (Millis et
al., in press). The explanatory text served as a method of remediation by providing
learners with more information about the topic being discussed; however, the text did not
directly address the case study being evaluated.
Finally, learners began the post-remediation phase (turns 10-13). After reading the
explanatory text, learners were prompted to self-report their current confusion (turns 1011). The forced-choice question presented in the post-remediation phase was the same as
the forced-choice question in the probe phase (turn 12). Learners responded to the forcedchoice question (turn 13), but did not receive feedback on the quality of their response.
The tutor agent then summarized the flaw in the first case study presented and moved on
to the next training session (not shown in Table 1). It is important to note that all
misleading information was corrected during this summary.
Procedure
Learners were individually tested in 2-hour sessions. First, learners signed an
informed consent and then completed the pretest. Next, learners read a short introductory
text on scientific reasoning. The introductory text provided learners with a broad
overview of the scientific reasoning terminology that was discussed during the training
sessions (control group, experimenter bias, random assignment, replication). Learners
then began the first of four training sessions. Each training session lasted for 10 minutes
(SD = 2 min), for an average total interaction of 47 minutes (SD = 8 min). In each
training session, learners discussed a different scientific reasoning topic and the
associated case study with the tutor agent. The training session interface is shown in
Figure 1 and consisted of (A) the tutor agent, (B) a description of the case study, (C) a
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text-transcript of the dialogue history, and (D) a text-box for learners to enter and submit
their responses. The tutor agent delivered the content of its utterances via synthesized
speech, while the human learner typed his or her responses. After completing all four
training sessions, learners completed the definition posttest and the transfer tasks. Finally,
learners completed four individual difference measures: School Failure Tolerance (SFT;
Clifford, 1984), Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher, Fernandez, Peterson, &
Reeder, 1986), Dweck’s intelligence mindset measure (Dweck, 2006), and the Revised
Causal Dimension Scale (McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992). Learners were fully
debriefed at the end of the experiment.

Figure 1. Learning Environment
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Three streams of information were recorded as learners completed the training
sessions. First, a video of the learner’s face was captured using a web cam. The web cam
also recorded all audio generated during the interaction. Second, a video of the learner’s
screen was recorded using a commercially available screen capture program called
Camtasia StudioTM. Third, a variety of interaction parameters were automatically
recorded in log files. These parameters include the learner’s responses (typed responses
and response times), the tutor’s interpretation of the response (correct or incorrect), and
the current state of the interaction (pretest vs. training session vs. posttest).
Results and Discussion
There were two sets of dependent measures in the present analyses, namely the
measures from the training session and the summative learning measures (i.e., posttest
assessments). The impact of learner individual differences on confusion induction and
learning were not investigated in the current thesis. Due to the repeated measurements
and nested structure of the data (trials nested within topics, topics nested within
conditions, and conditions nested within subjects), a mixed-effects modeling approach
was adopted for all analyses. Mixed-effect modeling is the recommended analysis
method for this type of data (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). Mixed-effects models include a
combination of fixed and random effects and can be used to assess the influence of the
fixed effects on dependent variables after accounting for any extraneous random effects.
The lme4 package in R (Bates & Maechler, 2010) was used to perform the requisite
computations.
Linear or logistic models were constructed on the basis of whether the dependent
variable was continuous or binary. The random effects were: learner (167 levels), topic
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(4 levels: control group, experimenter bias, random assignment, replication), and order
(order of presentation of topic). Condition was a four-level (correct-positive, correctnegative, incorrect-negative, incorrect-positive) categorical fixed effect. The comparisons
of relevance were correct-negative versus correct-positive and incorrect-positive versus
incorrect-negative. These comparisons were conducted in order to distinguish between
the effects of initial response and type of feedback received. For example, when correctnegative and correct-positive are compared, the only varied element is feedback type;
however, when correct-negative and incorrect-negative are compared both feedback type
and initial response differ between the two conditions. If both feedback type and initial
response are varied, then it is difficult to isolate the impact of false feedback on both
confusion induction and learning. For this reason, the current thesis will only compare
learners that initially responded in the same manner. For each dependent measure, then,
two mixed-effects models were constructed: (1) correct-negative vs. correct-positive and
(2) incorrect-positive vs. incorrect-negative.
To test the confidence moderation hypothesis, additional models were constructed
that included the interaction term of feedback condition (correct-negative, correctpositive, incorrect-positive, incorrect-negative) and confidence level (confident, not
confident). For all of the measures investigated, both the main effect of confidence level
and the interaction term (feedback x confidence) were not significant predictors.
Therefore, the subsequent analyses and discussion will focus on feedback condition as
the main predictor of each measure.
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Training Sessions
The discussion of training session results is divided into four sections based on
the phases of each session: (1) manipulation, (2) probe, (3) remediation, and (4) postremediation. Manipulation measures occurred immediately after learners received
feedback (turns 5 and 7 in Table 2), probe measures involved learner performance on a
near transfer case study (turn 9 in Table 2), the remediation measure was reading time on
the explanatory text, and post-remediation measures involved confusion and learner
performance after reading the explanatory text (turns 11 and 13 in Table 2).
The training session yielded 665 observations (167 learners x 4 training sessions,
with 3 observations removed due to experimenter error for each measure. The unit of
analyses was an individual topic, so there were 665 cases in the data set.
Manipulation Phase. Manipulation measures included two measures of learners’
responses to system feedback. Immediately after receiving feedback, learners were asked
to indicate when they were ready to proceed with the discussion and to indicate whether
they were confused or not confused. The length of time that learners took to respond was
assumed to be indicative of their reaction to the feedback received, with longer latencies
being affiliated with more confusion.
All response times were measured in milliseconds. In order to accommodate
individual differences, all response times were standardized in two ways. First, feedback
response times and explanatory text reading times were standardized (i.e., converted to zscores) for each learner. Second, all times were standardized across task (i.e., feedback
response time and explanatory text reading time). In this step, response and reading times
were standardized across learners for each task. This two-step process of standardizing
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response and reading times allows for differences in individual learner responses (e.g.,
fast vs. slow responders; Step 1) and differences in responding based on the task (e.g.,
reading the explanatory text will most likely take longer than responding to feedback;
Step 2).
Based on the false feedback hypothesis, it was predicted that inaccurate feedback
would induce confusion in learners. For the two manipulation measures, this means that
learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions would have longer feedback response
times and would report more confusion than those in the accurate feedback conditions.
Two mixed-effects linear regression models with feedback response time as the
dependent variable revealed that condition was a significant predictor1, but not for both
comparisons, F(3,665) = 1.52, Mse = 1.03. The coefficients for the models along with the
mean proportional occurrence (i.e., confusion self-report) or average standardized
response time (i.e., feedback response time) of each measure are presented in Table 3,
with significant results bolded (p < .05). Learners in the correct-negative condition took
significantly longer to respond after receiving feedback than learners in the correctpositive condition. However, learners who initially responded incorrectly took
approximately the same amount of time to respond to feedback, regardless of the type of
feedback received (incorrect-positive = incorrect-negative).
Learners were then asked to indicate whether they were confused or not confused
after receiving feedback. Using learners’ self-reported confusion ratings, two mixedeffects logistic regressions that detected the presence (coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0)
of confusion were constructed. Similar to feedback response time, learners in the correct-

1

Significance of mixed-effects models is evaluated by comparing the mixed-model (fixed +
random effects) to a random model (random effects only) with a likelihood ratio test.

32

negative condition reported significantly more confusion than those in the correctpositive condition, χ2(3) = 14.6. The difference between the estimates (i.e., B values) for
this comparison was 0.814, so learners were e0.814 or 2.3 times more likely to report
confusion in the correct-negative condition than in the correct-positive condition.
However, feedback condition was not a significant predictor for learners that initially
responded incorrectly.
The findings from the manipulation phase suggest that false feedback was more
effective when the learner was correct (correct-negative) than when the learner was
incorrect (incorrect-positive). In other words, learners that were more knowledgeable
were confused by the false feedback, whereas less knowledgeable learners were not
confused. This difference can be attributed to the difference between learners’ expected
outcome and the feedback received from the tutor agent. Prior to receiving feedback,
learners were required to indicate whether they were confident or not confident in the
correctness of their response. In general, learners are not very adept at accurately
monitoring their own knowledge (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Glenberg, Wilkinson, &
Epstein, 1982; Hacker, Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009; Maki, 1998). In fact, learners with
low knowledge are frequently overconfident in their knowledge, whereas learners with
high knowledge are frequently underconfident (Baker, 1985; Chi, Bassok, Lewis,
Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Graesser, Person, & Magliano, 1995; Otero & Graesser,
2001). However, in the current thesis, all learners were confident in their knowledge.
Regardless of actual response quality, 80% of learners reported confidence in their
response correctness. This suggests that most learners believed their responses were
correct, and expected to receive positive feedback from the agent. When the learners in
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the correct-negative condition received negative feedback, their expectations were
violated. However, learners in the incorrect-positive condition had their expectations
confirmed by the false feedback.
Probe Phase. Learners were asked to read and diagnose the flaw in a follow-up
transfer study. The false feedback hypothesis predicted that learners who received
inaccurate feedback in the manipulation phase would experience greater confusion and
uncertainty than those that received accurate feedback. From this hypothesis, the current
thesis predicted that learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions would perform more
poorly at identifying the flaw in the probe study than those in the accurate feedback
conditions.
Based on the findings of previous confusion induction studies (D’Mello et al., in
review; Lehman et al., 2011), the current thesis presumed that learners who were
experiencing uncertainty would answer incorrectly, whereas learners who answered
correctly were presumed to not be in a state of uncertainty. Logistic regression models
were used to predict the quality of flaw diagnosis (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect). Table 3
shows the proportional occurrence for each feedback condition and the model
coefficients. Feedback condition was a significant predictor of answer quality, indicating
that learners in both inaccurate feedback conditions performed more poorly than learners
in the accurate feedback conditions, χ2(3) = 89.8. However, this finding may be
misleading, as elaborated below.
When diagnosing the flaw in a study, learners were presented with a three
alternative forced-choice question. Of the 1,995 responses, learners typically selected
either the target (correct; 49%) or thematic miss (35%) response options, with fewer
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instances in which the distractor was selected (16%). When learners received negative
feedback (regardless of condition), they typically switched between the target and
thematic miss. In other words, if learners chose the target and then received negative
feedback, those learners were more likely to choose the thematic miss when diagnosing
the flaw in the probe phase. Conversely, learners that received positive feedback chose
the same response option in the probe phase. Thus, response quality might not be
indicative of uncertainty in the present context, but rather indicated that learners took the
tutor agent’s feedback seriously and strategically reversed their decisions accordingly.

Table 3
Results for Manipulation and Probe Phases
Coefficients (B)
CN
IP

CN

CP

IP

IN

Manipulation Phase
Feedback Response Latency
Confusion: After Feedback

.055
.562

-.102
.384

.012
.425

.012
.491

.181
.814

.005
-.374

Probe Phase
FC Question 2 Answer Quality

.234

.619

.281

.563

-1.84

-1.27

Measure

Notes. CN: correct-negative; CP: correct-positive; IP: incorrect-positive; IN: incorrect-negative. CP and IN
were the respective reference groups for the models; hence, coefficients for these conditions are not shown
in the table.

Remediation Phase. After the probe phase, learners were provided with an
explanatory text. The explanatory text was provided as a method of remediation to
facilitate confusion resolution. The current thesis predicted that learners in the inaccurate
feedback conditions would read the explanatory text more deeply in an attempt to resolve
their confusion. This effort was expected to manifest in increased reading times.
Ultimately, the increased reading time caused by confusion was expected to be beneficial
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for learning (facilitative confusion hypothesis). Table 4 shows the average reading time
for each feedback condition as well as the coefficients for each model.
Two mixed-effects linear regression models were used to predict the length of
reading time. For learners who initially responded incorrectly (incorrect-positive vs.
incorrect-negative), feedback condition was not a significant predictor of reading time.
However, for learners who initially responded correctly (correct-negative vs. correctpositive), feedback condition was a significant predictor, F(3,665) = 1.61, MSe = .822.
Learners in the correct-negative condition read the explanatory text for a longer amount
of time than those in the correct-positive condition. It may be that learners needed to be
consciously aware of their confusion to actively engage with the text in an attempt to
resolve their current confusion and reach a better understanding of the scientific
reasoning topic.
Post-Remediation Phase. Learner confusion and performance were assessed
after reading the explanatory texts. The false feedback hypothesis did not have specific
predictions about the impact of feedback condition on the post-remediation measures. For
example, learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions could have reported more
confusion and performed poorly if confusion was not resolved. However, if confusion
was resolved, learners in the inaccurate feedback conditions could have reported less
confusion and performed better than the accurate feedback conditions.
Learner confusion and response quality on flaw diagnosis were the postremediation measures. Four mixed-effects models were constructed to test for differences
based on feedback condition. Logistic regression models were used to detect the presence
(coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of confusion and to predict learner response quality
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(1= correct, 0 = incorrect). Table 4 shows the proportional occurrence of confusion and
response quality for each condition along with the coefficients for each model.
For all post-remediation measures, feedback condition was not a significant
predictor. Given this finding, the current thesis investigated the impact of explanatory
text read time on the post-remediation measures. Longer reading times could be
indicative of the learner attempting to resolve confusion, which is consistent with
impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003) and
thus, our second hypothesis, the facilitative confusion hypothesis. Text read time was
used as a predictor for the two post-remediation measures. Similar to feedback condition,
text read time did not significantly predict either of the post-remediation measures.

Table 4
Results for Remediation and Post-Remediation Phases

Measure

CN

CP

IP

IN

Coefficients (B)
CN
IP

Remediation Phase
Explanatory Text Read Time

.001

-.151 .116

.093

.145

.066

Post-Remediation Phase
Confusion: After Intervention
FC Question 3 Answer Quality

.226
.456

.201
.496

.284
.446

.086
-.219

-.038
-.070

.272
.430

Notes. CN: correct-negative; CP: correct-positive; IP: incorrect-positive; IN: incorrect-negative. CP and IN
were the respective reference groups for the models; hence, coefficients for these conditions are not shown
in the table.

Learning Outcomes
After completing the training sessions for all four scenarios, learning for each
topic was assessed on a final test at three levels: definition, near transfer, and far transfer.
For both transfer tasks learner performance was assessed in two ways: hits (correctly
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identifying the presence of a flaw) and false alarms (correctly identifying the absence of a
flaw). False alarms allow for an assessment of the degree to which learners are incorrect
or guessing during the transfer tasks. If there were a significant effect for hit
performance, then false alarm performance reflected the guessing or incorrect application
of flaw knowledge. The unit of analysis was the individual topic, resulting in 665
observations (167 learners x 4 training sessions, with three sessions removed due to
experimenter error) for the learning outcome measures.
Feedback Condition. When inaccurate feedback conditions successfully induce
confusion, this experience of confusion was expected to result in increased learning
(facilitative confusion hypothesis). Six mixed-effects logistic regression models were
constructed to predict response quality for the definition, near transfer, and far transfer
posttests (correct coded as 1, incorrect coded as 0) based on feedback condition.
Feedback condition was not a significant predictor of learner performance on any of the
posttest assessments. This finding likely occurred because these models did not
distinguish between cases in which learners were confused or not confused during the
training session. However, this finding does show that providing inaccurate feedback was
not detrimental to learning (when misleading information is corrected).
Confusion Resolution. Although feedback condition did not yield assessment
differences in the final test, the current thesis also hypothesized that experiences of
confusion and confusion resolution would positively impact learning (facilitative
confusion hypothesis). Therefore, an analysis was performed to investigate whether final
test performance was predicted by confusion resolution. Specifically, the current thesis
predicted that learners who resolved their confusion would outperform learners that
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remain in a state of confusion. Confusion resolution was defined as the change in selfreported confusion from time 1 (after feedback) to time 2 (after text reading). There were
four levels of resolution: no confusion (not confused at time 1 or time 2, with 289
observations), confusion resolved (confused at time 1 and not confused at time 2, with
214 observations), confusion unresolved (confused at time 1 and time 2, with 99
observations), and confusion created (not confused at time 1 but confused at time 2, with
63 observations).
Mixed-effects logistic regression models were constructed to predict learner
performance on the three posttests based on confusion resolution. Learners who resolved
their confusion performed better than those with unresolved confusion or no confusion (p
< .1) on the definition posttest, χ2(3) = 4.08. However, confusion resolution was not a
significant predictor for the near transfer, χ2(3) = 2.89, p = .408, or far transfer tasks,
χ2(3) = .447, p = .930. These results suggest that confusion resolution did not facilitate
deeper learning in the present study.
Feedback Condition and Self-Reported Confusion Interaction. It is possible
that learners must consciously recognize their confusion in order to begin engaging in
beneficial cognitive activities (VanLehn et al. 2003). This is also consistent with the
facilitative confusion hypothesis because it is possible that the cognitive activities
triggered by confusion are enough to promote learning. To address this possibility,
differences in learning outcomes based on self-reported confusion after feedback were
investigated. This was investigated with six mixed-effects models with condition, selfreported confusion, and the condition × confusion interaction term. There were no
significant main effects for condition or confusion, but the interaction term was
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significant. However, the interaction was only significant for the far transfer task, χ2(7) =
23.3.
The interaction was deciphered by regressing far transfer performance on the
confused and not confused cases separately. Of the 665 total observations, learners
reported confusion in 313 cases, and did not report being confused in 352 cases. The
models for the not confused cases were only significant for the correct-negative and
correct-positive comparison. Learners in the correct-negative condition performed
significantly worse than the correct-positive condition when they did not report
experiencing confusion. For the confused cases, both models were significant. When they
reported confusion, learners in both inaccurate feedback conditions performed
significantly better than those in the accurate feedback conditions (see Table 5). In other
words learners who received inaccurate feedback were 2.7 (correct-negative; B = 1.02;
e1.02 = 2.7) and 2.4 (incorrect-positive; B = .867; e.867 = 2.4) times more likely to detect a
flaw when they reported being confused compared to the control conditions.
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Table 5
Performance on Learning Measures as a Function of Self-Reported Confusion

Learning Measure
Definition
Not Confused
Confused
Near Transfer: Hit
Not Confused
Confused
Far Transfer: Hit
Not Confused
Confused
Far Transfer: False Alarm
Not Confused
Confused

Proportional Occurrence
CN
CP
IP
IN

Coefficients (B)
CN
IP

.529
.660

.637
.593

.558
.557

.453
.550

-.263
-.055

.249
.220

.439
.439

.500
.379

.470
.548

.413
.534

-.047
.201

.384
.206

.112
.268

.261
.121

.235
.413

.310
.246

-1.16
1.02

-.410
.867

.163
.166

.126
.083

.129
.144

.161
.124

.044
.078

-.028
.016

Notes. CN: correct-negative; CP: correct-positive; IP: incorrect-positive; IN: incorrect-negative. CP and IN
were the respective reference groups for the models; hence, coefficients for these conditions are not shown
in the table.

Far transfer tests are the gold standard for learning because they challenge
learners to apply their new knowledge to a new situation. Our results therefore suggest
that providing false feedback can have a positive effect on learning, but only if the
feedback manipulation is successful in triggering an impasse and the resultant confusion.
It is also important to note that there were no significant differences between the
inaccurate and accurate feedback conditions on far transfer false alarm responses. Thus, it
is not the case that the enhanced performance for learners in the inaccurate feedback
conditions was due to guessing.
Conclusion
In the last decade research has shown that learning is an emotional experience and
that emotions play an important role in the learning process (Arroyo et al., 2009;
Burleson & Picard, 2007; Chaffar, Derbalie, & Frasson, 2009; Conati & Maclaren, 2009;
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Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello, in review; D’Mello et al., 2009; Forbes-Riley & Litman,
2009; Graesser et al., 2007; Pekrun, 2010; Robison, McQuiggan, & Lester, 2009; Smith
& Kirby, 2009). Some learning environments have even begun to adaptively respond to
learner emotions in an attempt to facilitate learning (Arroyo et al., 2009; D’Mello et al.,
2009; D’Mello et al., 2011; Litman & Forbes-Riley, 2006). Whereas these systems are
reacting to the emotions of learners, this thesis is taking another approach to emotions
and learning. Specifically, this thesis investigated the utility of proactively inducing
emotional states that are related to positive learning outcomes. The reported experiment
is part of a larger research project investigating confusion induction during learning.
Previously, confusion has been induced through the presentation of system breakdowns
(D’Mello & Graesser, in review) and contradictory information (D’Mello et al., in
review; Lehman et al., 2011). The current thesis explored the utility of false system
feedback as another medium for confusion induction.
Alignment of Findings with Hypotheses
The thesis tested three hypotheses that relate to confusion induction and the
relationship between confusion and learning within a learning environment that discussed
scientific reasoning topics. First, the current thesis tested the false feedback hypothesis
and found evidence that supported false feedback as an effective method for confusion
induction. Self-reported confusion after receiving feedback revealed that false feedback
was effective for inducing confusion. A more objective indicator of confusion (feedback
response time) supported the false feedback hypothesis as well. However, false feedback
was not successful in all situations. It appears that false feedback was more effective
when learners were correct than when they were incorrect.
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It is also important to note that confusion was induced through events that were
tied to the learning process (i.e., feedback). This can be contrasted with task independent
methods of induction that have been used in previous research such as having learners
watch an emotion-inducing video (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). However, much of
the research using emotion-inducing videos has been limited to Ekman’s (1973) “basic”
emotions, so a direct comparison for confusion induction is not currently possible. This is
particularly important for the incorporation of confusion induction into learning
environments that aim to regulate the induced confusion.
Regarding the second hypothesis, the current thesis investigated the potential
moderating effect of learner confidence on confusion induction (confidence moderation
hypothesis). Unfortunately, the current experiment did not support learner confidence as a
moderator for confusion induction. However, it is still possible that confidence will be a
moderating factor on confusion induction, if learners are capable of more accurately
monitoring their own knowledge. It is possible that the learning scenario in the current
research is not high stakes enough for learners to truly be introspective and reflect on
their level of confidence. It is also possibly that the method in which confidence was
assessed (offering learners the option to change their response), was not appropriate.
Perhaps if learners were placed into a more game-like scenario in which they won or lost
points based on both the quality of their answer and their confidence level would result in
a more accurate assessment of learner confidence.
For the facilitative confusion hypothesis, false feedback and confusion were
expected to influence learning. Contrary to impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown &
VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003), it was not the resolution of confusion that
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predicted learning; rather, it was the experience of confusion that had the strongest effect
on learning. Cognitive disequilibrium theory proposes that the shift from equilibrium to
disequilibrium triggers a set of cognitive activities to restore equilibrium (Caroll & Kay,
1988; Graesser & Olde, 2003; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). From the results in the present
experiment and past findings (D’Mello & Graesser, in review; D’Mello et al., in review;
Lehman et al., 2011), it appears that it may be enough to simply trigger the cognitive
activities associated with equilibrium restoration. Thus, our second hypothesis
(facilitative confusion) was partially supported. Learners that received false feedback and
were consciously aware of their confusion during the training session were ultimately
more successful at applying scientific reasoning skills to new research case studies.
For learning environments to take advantage of the benefits of confusion, they
must be able to induce, track, and regulate learner experiences of confusion. In the false
feedback learning environment the current thesis has attempted to address all three tasks.
Confusion was induced through false system feedback, tracked by self-reports, and
regulated by attempting to facilitate confusion resolution with an explanatory text.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are four main limitations to the present research that need to be addressed
in future experiments. First, some critics might object to providing learners with
inaccurate feedback due to the potential for negative impacts on learning. Although this is
a legitimate concern, it is not warranted for the present research for three reasons: (a) all
misleading information was corrected at the end of each training session, (b) learners
were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment, and (c) there were no signs of negative
impacts on learning. In fact, learners who received inaccurate feedback generally
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performed comparably to those that received accurate feedback, with one exception, and
in some circumstances outperformed learners receiving accurate feedback.
The second limitation pertains to tracking confusion during the training session.
Previous research reported that performance on forced-choice questions during the
training session was indicative of learners’ uncertainty (D’Mello et al., in review;
Lehman et al., 2011). However, in the present research the forced-choice questions posed
to learners were not a reliable source. Instead, learner self-reports were used as an
indication of experiences of confusion. Although learner self-reports are a subjective
measure, the findings were supported by a more objective measure (feedback response
time). It is possible that performance on the forced-choice questions was not effective in
the present experiment because of the way in which forced-choice questions were
designed. In particular, the answer options may have not been sufficiently sensitive to
reveal confusion.
Third, attempts to regulate confusion were limited in the present research due to
the nature of the remediation method. The explanatory text provided only broad, general
information about the topic, but did not directly address the case study being discussed.
Consequently, the remediation method was passive, in the sense that learners had to
actively engage with the text on their own (e.g., make inferences, compare new
information to their existing mental models, modify their existing mental models, etc.).
This can be contrasted with a more active type of remediation, such as adaptive
scaffolding and misconception correction by a pedagogical agent or human tutor. As
previously mentioned, the explanatory texts were not tailored to the case studies being
discussed. Thus, the texts contained both relevant and irrelevant information for the task
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of flaw diagnosis. The irrelevant information may have caused interference for learners
and limited successful confusion resolution and increased learning from this remediation
method. The current thesis hypothesizes that more adaptive and targeted forms of
remediation that help learners regulate and potentially resolve confusion will further
increase learning.
Finally, the present findings are limited because they were found in only one
experiment and were not replicated. A replication of the present findings is therefore
warranted. A follow-up experiment is planned to investigate the impact of false feedback
within a learning environment that involves a trialogue (tutor agent, peer student agent,
and human learner) discussion of scientific reasoning topics. This second experiment will
allow for further evaluation of false feedback as a method for confusion induction and
determination of the circumstances under which it is effective.
Concluding Remarks
The current thesis has described a learning environment that takes a proactive role
in the learning process by inducing confusion. The next step in this line of research is to
determine the most effective ways to help learners regulate their confusion. There are
many potential interventions that could be used to convert these learning opportunities in
to actual learning gains (Lehman et al., in press). It is unlikely that a one-size fits-all
intervention exists for confusion regulation. Therefore, future research will need to
determine not only the types of interventions, but also the learners’ individual differences
that contribute to the effectiveness of each intervention. Once the learning interventions
and learner characteristics have been identified, a learning environment can be designed
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that induces a beneficial emotional state for learning and provides adaptive,
individualized scaffolding to maximize learning and engagement.
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APPENDIX A
Transfer Task
Original Study (inappropriate control group):
There was a study where subjects took this new diet pill called 'Pounds Off' and said that
they lost on average 10 pounds in the first month of taking it. The article said that none of
the participants exercised or ate super healthy or anything, they just acted normally while
taking the pill. They even compared it to another group of people who didn’t take the pill
and just acted how they normally do. That group didn’t lose any weight. So Pounds Off
works like ten times as well as not doing anything.
Near Transfer Study:
So there's this great new pill that completely clears up your complexion, practically
overnight no more acne! Researchers did a study on "Zit-B-Gone" and found that people
who took it had no more acne after just two days. The article said that everyone in the
study stopped using any face masks or special face washes when they started taking "ZitB-Gone". All they did was rinse their face with water twice a day. There was another
group of people who didn't take" Zit-B-Gone" and continued with their normal routines
for washing their faces. The group that didn't take "Zit-B-Gone" had no reduction in their
acne after two days. So "Zit-B-Gone" is like a new miracle acne treatment!
Far Transfer Study:
A trainer developed a new system that will have your dog well behaved over night. Lots
of people have been using videos to train their dogs at home; this new system will get
people to bring their dogs to the kennel. It combines traditional reinforcement and
hypnotherapy. Dogs go through an intensive eight-hour session on basic commands
(reinforcement). Then while the dogs sleep a tape is played that says the command,
correct behavior, and praise (hypnosis). The trainers tested this with two groups, one did
the new system (reinforcement + hypnosis) and the other group used the training videos
at home (video). At the completion of each training type the dogs were evaluated on their
behavior. The dogs that did the new system (reinforcement + hypnosis) did the best and it
took less than 24 hours! One trainer tried out this system at another kennel. The new
system didn’t work as well at this new kennel, but it still worked better than the training
videos. So if you need your dog trained this is the way to go!
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APPENDIX B
Experimenter Bias Explanatory Text
One of the easiest factors of the environment to control is the effect of the researcher or
experimenter. We know from several experiments, that the behavior or expectations of a
researcher can have a significant impact on the results of an experiment. When this
happens, it is not possible to determine whether the results were due to the independent
variable or to actions of the experimenter. There are two important flaws to consider here.
The first type of flaw focuses on our motivation (conscious or unconscious) to bias the
results; the second type of flaw focuses on our ability to bias the results.
Conflict of interest occurs when a researcher has a strong investment (fame or
fortune) in a particular outcome of the experiment. This is a problem because the
researcher may intentionally or unintentionally bias the experiment. For example, if we
were conducting an experiment on the benefits of exercise on memory and we were paid
by an exercise equipment company, we could have a conflict of interest. You should
know that a conflict of interest doesn’t guarantee that a researcher will bias the results,
but it creates a situation in which a researcher is more motivated to influence the
outcome.
Opportunity for bias is a flaw in which the experimenter does not take important
precautions to reduce his or her chances of affecting the behavior of the participants. The
best precaution is using a double-blind technique in which both the researcher and the
participant are unaware of which condition the participant is in. A second method is to
reduce contact with the participants. Most experiments are automated so that a computer
presents the instructions rather than the experimenter doing so. A third method is to use
automated or objective scoring of data. If that is not possible, then two raters should score
all data independently (inter-rater reliability) without knowing the participant’s condition
(double-blind). For our memory experiment, if we use a recall rather then multiple choice
test of memory, then the experimenter will have to determine which recall responses are
correct and which are incorrect. This is an opportunity for bias. Therefore, two raters who
are unaware of conditions should be used. We need to reduce the opportunity and
motivation for experimenters to bias the results of an experiment, or we will not be able
to rely on the results.

63

Institutional Review Board Approval

64

